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Abstract—We propose a novel architecture for generic bio-
metric authentication based on deep neural networks: RegNet.
Differently from other methods, RegNet learns a mapping of
the input biometric traits onto a target distribution in a well-
behaved space in which users can be separated by means of
simple and tunable boundaries. More specifically, authorized
and unauthorized users are mapped onto two different and
well behaved Gaussian distributions. The novel approach of
learning the mapping instead of the boundaries further avoids
the problem encountered in typical classifiers for which the learnt
boundaries may be complex and difficult to analyze. RegNet
achieves high performance in terms of security metrics such
as Equal Error Rate (EER), False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and
Genuine Acceptance Rate (GAR). The experiments we conducted
on publicly available datasets of face and fingerprint confirm the
effectiveness of the proposed system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Biometric authentication systems are becoming ubiquitous
thanks to their undoubtful convenience as the users are authen-
ticated based on information they inherently own, avoiding the
need to remember passwords or provide keys.
Typically first a user’s biometric traits, i.e. face, fingerprint
or retina, are acquired through a sensor and then processed
in such a way that discriminative features are extracted, and
used to compute a template. This phase, which is referred
to as “enrollment”, prepares the system to grant access only
to the authorized user. In the subsequent phase, which is
referred to as “verification”, the biometric trait of a user who
requests to be granted access is given as input to the system.
Therefore, in order to perform a decision, the stored template
is matched with that of the fresh biometric trait through some
appropriate distance metric. Based on the outcome of the
matching procedure the user is authenticated or rejected.
One of the most challenging aspects of a biometric authen-
tication system is to have a negligible number of wrongly ac-
cepted users, yet providing excellent recognition performance
by allowing the system to be invariant with respect to some
transformations, e.g. pose and illumination.
With this work we propose to address this problem by means
of deep neural networks. Indeed, deep learning based meth-
ods have recently shown excellent performance at learning
complex mappings [1, 2] and addressing difficult classification
tasks [3]. In this regards, biometric authentication may be seen
as a two-class classification problem in which the network has
to learn how to correctly classify the enrolled user versus every
other user.
However, the downside of deep learning classification meth-
ods is that the boundaries which are learned in order to parti-
tion the feature space are highly complex and non-linear [4].
Works which addressed this specific problem [4, 5] concluded
that most of the mass of the data points gathers close to the
decision boundaries and as such this may strongly affect the
robustness of the classifier. Within the context of biometric
authentication, this may lead two similar biometric traits of a
user to be assigned to different classes, leading to an error.
To address this problem we propose a novel classification
strategy in which the feature distributions are regularized so
as to lead to simple boundaries between the classes, thereby
reducing the probability of misclassification. In particular, we
aim at designing a classifier having “non-arbitrary” bound-
aries, which can be related to a clear data model and can
eventually be tuned in order to achieve the desired perfor-
mance. In order to reach our goal, we seek a compact yet
meaningful mapping of the input biometric traits into a lower
dimensional space which we will refer to as the latent space.
Further, we constrain the latent space to be shaped in a simple
and well-behaved manner (specifically, to follow Gaussian
distributions) so that the region of the space corresponding
to the authorized user is well-separated from that containing
all the other users, i.e. we want the points to be separable
with linear boundaries. The resulting system, which we will
refer to as RegNet, employs simple threshold-based rules in
this regularized latent space in order to discriminate between
the authorized user and everyone else.
A. Related work
Several methods have been proposed to address the biomet-
ric authentication task when dealing with faces, fingerprints,
retinas and gait. In this work we will focus on faces and
fingerprints as we evaluate the performance of RegNet on these
biometric traits.
Fingerprint authentication systems were among the first
and most studied ones. Examples of non-learning based ap-
proached are [6, 7] and [8, 9] in which the matching is made
on the global and local minutiae information respectively.
Regarding deep learning based models, most of the effort has
been put towards methods to extract and classify the minutiae.
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As an example, in [10] a Convolutional Neural Network
(CNN) is used to extract minutiae from raw fingerprint images.
On the face authentication side, one of the earliest and most
well-known examples is the Fisherfaces method [11] which,
thanks to the introduction of a supervised approach, improved
robustness to illumination changes. More recent approaches
are based on low-dimensional representations of the faces;
examples include sparse [12] and manifold [13] represen-
tations. A huge increase in performance has been obtained
only recently with the advent of deep learning methods such
as Facenet [14], Deepface [15] and ArcFace [16] which, by
learning the features through deep CNN, are able to achieve
state-of-the-art results.
From the above works it becomes clear that learning-based
methods have mainly addressed biometric authentication as
a classification problem. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first approach to biometric authentication in which the
paradigm is shifted from learning the classifcation boundaries
to learning the mapping to a latent space. In this regard we
mention some notable works which addressed the problem
of learning a mapping into a regularized space. Examples
include adversarial [17] and variational autoencoders [18] in
which the encoded representation is regularized to follow a
target distribution. Regarding this latter work, we highlight
that RegNet is conceptually different. In fact, as will become
clear in the following, we propose a network which directly
generates samples from the intended distribution; this is in
contrast to variational autoencoders in which the network
learns the parameters of a distribution from which the samples
are then drawn.
II. PROPOSED METHOD
The main goal of RegNet is to learn a mapping from the
distribution of the input biometric traits of authorized and
unauthorized users to some well-behaved distributions in the
latent space. More specifically, the biometric traits of the
authorized user should be mapped to a target distribution
whose mass center is far enough from that of the target
distribution of unauthorized users. In this way, since that the
latent space is well-behaved, a simple thresholding decision
rule can be employed in order to discriminate among the two
classes.
Being a biometric authentication system, RegNet operates
in two phases: enrollment and authentication. In the following
we will discuss in detail these two phases, which within
the context of deep neural networks directly translate to the
training and test phases.
A. Enrollment
In this phase the network has to learn the distribution of the
biometric traits of the authorized user (respectively unautho-
rized users) and has to generate a sample drawn from the
authorized (respectively unauthorized) target distribution. It
becomes evident that, in order to define a proper loss function,
we should minimize a suitable distance metric between the
distributions of the generated samples and the target ones.
Thus, let us first define the desired target distributions Pa
and Pu (for authorized and unauthorized users respectively) as
two multivariate Gaussian distributions over a d-dimensional
space:
Pa = N (µTa,ΣTa), Pu = N (µTu,ΣTu),
where ΣTa = σ2TaId and ΣTu = σ2TuId are defined as diag-
onal covariance matrices and µTa = µTa1T , µTu = µTu1T
are the mean vectors.
At this point, in order to define a suitable distance metric
let us define the output of the encoding network as z = H(x),
where z ∈ Rd is the latent mapping and x ∈ Rn is the input
biometric trait. Further, let B = {Ba=0,Ba=1} denote the set
of all possible biometric traits and a ∈ {0, 1} an indicator
variable such that a = 1 represents the authorized user and
a = 0 represents all other unauthorized users. The goal is to
learn an encoding function of the input biometric trait z =
H(x) such that z ∼ Pa if x ∈ Ba=1 and z ∼ Pu if x ∈ Ba=0,
with Pa and Pu the target distributions in the latent space.
We are now interested in computing the statistics of the
generated samples z, thus we should recall that during the
training the network is given as input a batch of biometric
traits X ∈ Rb×n with b being the batch size, thus resulting in
Z ∈ Rb×d after the encoding. Therefore, we can compute the
first and second order statistics (over a batch) of the encoded
representations Za,Zb related to authorized (µOa,ΣOa) and
unauthorized (µOu,ΣOu) input biometric traits respectively.
More specifically, we have that µ(i)Oa = E[Z
(i)
a ] and Σ
(ii)
Oa =
var(Z
(i)
a ), where (i) denotes the i-th colum and (ii) the i-th
diagonal entry.
Having defined the statistics of both target and encoded
samples distributions, we can define a suitable metric to
compare how far the distributions are from each other. More
in detail we employ the KL divergence, which for multivariate
Gaussian distributions (in case of authorized input biometric
traits) can be written as:
La = 1
2
[
log
|ΣTa|
|ΣOa| − d+ tr(Σ
−1
TaΣOa) +
+ (µTa − µOa)ᵀΣ−1Ta(µTa − µOa)
]
For the case of diagonal covariance matrices we are consider-
ing can be rewritten as
La = 1
2
[
log
σ2dTa∏
i Σ
(ii)
Oa
− d+
∑
i Σ
(ii)
Oa
σ2Ta
+
||µTa − µOa||2
σ2Ta
]
.
In a similar fashion we can obtain Lu by considering the
statistic’s of both target and encoded distributions in the case
of unauthorized input biometric traits.
Then, the loss function which the encoder network has to
minimize is given by L = 12La + 12Lu, which achieves its
minimum when the statistics of the two generated distributions
will match that of the target ones.
At this point we note that we are shaping the distribution of
the encoded samples by only enforcing first and second order
statistics. Indeed, from our experiments we have observed that
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Fig. 1: RegNet architecture. The biometric traits are given as input to the encoder; the output is a sample z from either Pa or
Pu. During the authentication phase, given z a thresholding decision can be applied to determine the user’s class.
these statistics are sufficient to shape the encoded samples
distributions to closely follow the target ones. This leads us
to conjecture that the encoder output tends to a maximum
entropy distribution (Gaussian) and thus first and second order
moments are sufficient to shape the latent space as intended.
B. Authentication
Following the enrollment phase, we can use the trained
encoder to perform user authentication.
In the authentication phase the encoder network is used
to compute the latent representation of the input biometric
trait. Then, since the latent space is well-behaved, a threshold
applied on the `2 norm of the latent representation can be
employed in order to output a decision. Under the assumption
of µTa < µTu and σTa = σTu, the decision step can be
formalized as follows:{
accept if ||z||2 ≤ τ,
reject if ||z||2 > τ,
where τ is an adjustable threshold that can be varied to obtain
the desired trade-off between false acceptance rate (FAR) and
false rejection rate (FRR).
C. Architecture details
RegNet deals with image biometric data, therefore we
employ a convolutional neural network for the encoder archi-
tecture. More specifically, we use a ResNet-18 architecture
[19] made of four blocks, each of them consisting of an
increasing number of 3×3 filters, see Fig. 1. The last layer is a
fully connected layer which maps the output of the last filter to
z: the d-dimensional latent representation. For the experiments
we set d = 3 as it leads to better separation in the latent space
and thus higher performance. Furthermore, we set µTa = 0,
µTu = 40 and σTa = σTu = 1. To optimize the network we
employ Adam optimizer and use stochastic gradient descent
over mini-batches of size 100 samples.
III. EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS AND RESULTS
A. Datasets
In biometric authentication systems it is common to assume
that the user puts him/herself in a controlled condition for the
biometric acquisition (e.g. frontal face pose). This motivates us
to consider constrained datasets, i.e. those dataset in which the
biometric traits have been acquired in constrained conditions.
For the face authentication task we employ two commonly
used datasets. The first dataset we employ is the CMU Multi-
PIE dataset [20]. It consists of samples with different poses
illumination and expressions. In total it has 750,000 samples
of 337 subjects acquired in 4 different sessions. We consider
the frontal poses of 129 subjects which are common in all
4 sessions. In total each user has 220 samples. We split the
data as 75% for training and the remaining 25% for testing.
For a single user enrollment out of 220 samples of authorized
user, 165 are used for the training and remaining are left for
testing. For unauthorized users enrollment out of 128 users, 96
users samples are used for the training and remaining 28 users
samples are left for the testing. We resize the images from
480x640x3 to 144x192x3. In total, we consider 32 candidates
for authorized user enrollment. Further to create more diverse
samples, we employ the mixup strategy as described in [21]:
positive and negative training samples are mixed through
convex combination.
The second dataset we consider is the cropped version of
extended Yale Face Database B [22]. It contains the frontal
pose of 38 subjects with varying illumination conditions with
approximately 59 samples of size 192 × 168 for every user.
For each enrollment, the dataset is split into training and test
sets for both the authorized and unauthorized users. For each
authorized user, out of the 59 images, 49 are used for training
and 10 for testing. For the case of unauthorized users, 31 users
are used for training (1829 samples) and 6 are left for testing
(354 samples). The total number of training and test samples
is 1878 and 364 respectively. Finally, by employing crops of
size 184×160, the samples are augmented by an augmentation
factor of F = 81 and F1 = 25. Further to create more diverse
samples we employ mixup strategy as explained for CMU
Multi-PIE dataset.
The fingerprint authentication experiments are performed
on Fingerprint Verification Competition (FVC 2006) DB2 [23]
dataset. The dataset is made of 150 users, each of them
containing 12 image samples acquired by an optical sensor.
The images of size 560 × 400 are resized to 202 × 149. For
each enrollment, out of the 12 images of each authorized user,
10 are used for training and the remaining ones for testing. For
the case of unauthorized users, 124 users are used for training
(1488 samples) and 25 are left for testing (300 samples). The
total number of training and test samples is 1498 and 302
respectively. The dataset is augmented to augmentation factors
of F = 289 and F1 = 25 by cropping the images down to
186 × 133 pixels. As done for the face dataset we employ
mixup [21].
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Fig. 2: Face authentication scores for authorized users (blue) and unauthorized users (red) for Yale B. (a) Histogram of ||z||2
decision statistics of RegNet; (b) Histogram of the sigmoid outputs of RegNet encoder classifier; (c) Histogram of the sigmoid
outputs of FaceNet embeddings classifier; (d) Histogram of the sigmoid outputs of ArcFace embeddings classifier; (e) Histogram
of the normalized matching distances of Fisherfaces. The plots in (b)-(c) depict a detailed view to better appreciate the leakage
effects.
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Fig. 3: Face authentication scores for authorized users (blue) and unauthorized users (red) for Multi-PIE. (a) Histogram of
||z||2 decision statistics of RegNet; (b) Histogram of the sigmoid outputs of RegNet encoder classifier; (c) Histogram of the
sigmoid outputs of FaceNet embeddings classifier; (d) Histogram of the sigmoid outputs of ArcFace embeddings classifier; (e)
Histogram of the normalized matching distances of Fisherfaces. The plots in (b)-(c) depict a detailed view to better appreciate
the leakage effects.
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Fig. 4: Fingerprint authentication scores for authorized users (blue) and unauthorized users (red). (a) Histogram of ||z||2 decision
statistics for RegNet; (b) Histogram of the sigmoid outputs of the RegNet encoder classifier; (c) histogram of the matching
scores of Verifinger; (d) histogram of the matching scores of the hybrid approach. The plot in (b) depicts a detailed view to
better appreciate the leakage effects.
B. Results
Face authentication. In this case we compare the results
of RegNet with the RegNet encoder classifier, the Fisherfaces
approach [11], FaceNet [14] and ArcFace [16]. The RegNet
encoder classifer is a network with the same structure as the
RegNet encoder, but trained in a more classical way through
sigmoid cross-entropy loss. This network does not employ a
variational loss function, therefore it allows us to assess the
improvement obtained via the learned mapping with respect
to a conventional neural network. Regarding FaceNet and
ArcFace, since it is not possible to train it from scratch because
of the extreme data scarcity, we compute the 512-dimensional
embeddings of the input images given a pre-trained network
on the CASIA WebFace dataset [25]. Then, a classifier is
independently trained on the embeddings of each user.
As can be seen from Table I, RegNet achieves the highest
performance on all the considered metrics. It is important to
notice that the RegNet encoder classifier, while sharing the
RegNet architecture, achieves lower performance especially at
low FAR, see Fig. 5(a)-(b). This suggests that the well-defined
regions in the latent space given by the target distributions
yield a more robust classification scheme. Indeed, as can
be seen in Fig. 3(a) and 2(a), RegNet effectively separates
authorized and unauthorized users. A good separation is also
achieved by other methods, see Fig. 3(b)-(c) and 2(b)-(c);
however they fail to assign to all the unauthorized users
a correct score, yielding some “leakage” into the wrong
distribution. This behavior can indeed be more clearly noticed
in ROC comparison in Fig. 5(a)-(b). Further, it can also be
noticed that the proposed approach performs better at low FAR
values when compared to RegNet encoder classifier.
At this point it is also interesting to notice that deep learning
based methods are able to achieve higher performance when
tested on the Multi-PIE dataset. Even though this dataset
Dataset Method EER% GAR@10−1FAR% GAR@10−2FAR% Accuracy@EER
RegNet 0.023 100.0 100.0 99.977
RegNet enc. classifier 0.040 100.0 100.0 99.960
FaceNet 1.286 98.819 98.712 98.714
ArcFace 0.893 99.159 99.108 99.107Face - Yale B
Fisherfaces 15.351 84.215 61.135 84.649
RegNet 0.045 100.0 100.0 99.955
RegNet enc. classifier 0.676 100.0 99.432 99.324
FaceNet 0.930 99.368 99.201 99.070
ArcFace 1.811 98.811 98.125 98.189Face - Multi-PIE
Fisherfaces 32.620 10.002 2.800 67.379
TABLE I: Performance comparison of RegNet with respect to other biometric authentication schemes for faces.
Dataset Method EER% GAR@10−1FAR% GAR@10−2FAR% Accuracy@EER
RegNet 0.476 100.0 99.934 99.524
RegNet enc. classifier 0.565 100.0 99.845 99.435
Verifinger 0.758 100.0 99.796 99.361Fingerprint FVC 2006
Hybrid approach [9] 3.200 98.182 94.854 96.799
TABLE II: Performance comparison of RegNet with respect to other biometric authentication schemes for fingerprints.
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Fig. 5: ROC comparison on overall results of 32 users for faces (a)-(b) and fingerprint (c) datasets. RegNet is compared with
the RegNet encoder classifier, FaceNet [14], ArcFace [16] and Fisherfaces [11] in (a)-(b); with RegNet encoder classifier,
VeriFinger [24] and the hybrid approach [9] in (c).
is more complex with respect to the Yale B because of
the unconstrained acquisitions, it has more samples. For this
reason, methods which can learn complex features from the
data will benefit. Conversely, traditional approaches such as
Fisherfaces by relying on properly aligned and constrained
images show a performance drop when tested on the more
complex Multi-PIE dataset.
Fingerprint authentication. For fingerprint authentication
we compare RegNet with RegNet encoder classifier, Verifinger
[24], and the hybrid approach described in [9]. As for the
equal error rate (EER), the proposed method achieves an
EER of 0.476% outperforming all the other approaches. In
terms of genuine acceptance rate (GAR) at small FAR values,
the proposed method outperforms the hybrid approach, and
improves over RegNet encoder classifier and Verifinger. As
previously observed for the case of face authentication, in Fig.
4(a) it can be seen how RegNet effectively separates authorized
and unauthorized users. However, it can also be noticed that
the distribution of authorized users spreads more with respect
to the case of the face dataset. This might be due to the
extremely small number of training samples for the authorized
user which is only 10 prior to the augmentation. In the case
of non deep learning approaches Fig. 4(c)-(d), the authorized
and unauthorized users do not have a clear scores separation.
Additionally, it can be seen that the RegNet encoder classifier
is still introducing some “leakage”. This aspect can be further
noticed in Fig. 5(c): RegNet outperforms all other methods by
achieving highest values of GAR even for low values of FAR.
The above results strongly motivate the intuition behind
RegNet: learning the mapping instead of the classification
boundaries leads to improved performance and robustness of
the classifier.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We presented a novel strategy to address the biometric
authentication problem with deep neural networks. Instead
of learning complex boundaries, the proposed approach aims
at learning a mapping onto target distributions allowing for
simple threshold-based classification. We demonstrated that
RegNet is an effective general-purpose biometric authenti-
cation framework which can achieve low EER and good
latent space separation as demonstrated through extensive
experiments on two different biometric traits. Furthemore, the
comparison with a network sharing the same architecture as
RegNet but trained in a more standard way, allowed us to show
the superiority of the proposed architecture.
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